A seemingly simple dispute over a 22-line Facebook post gave the Court of Justice an opportunity to address three issues of broader relevance for copyright and media businesses.
First, what makes a text a protected “work”?
On this point, the judgment does not seek to reinvent the originality test. Rather, it provides a useful and timely reaffirmation of the Court’s established approach: what matters is whether the subject matter constitutes an intellectual creation reflecting the personality of its author through free and creative choices, expressed in a sufficiently precise and objective manner.
Importantly, the Court expressly confirms that the length of a text, the fact that it was posted online, and whether it belongs to a predetermined literary genre are irrelevant to its qualification as a “work”, unless such factors reflect rules, technical considerations or constraints leaving no room for creative freedom.
This may not be a new doctrine, but it is a valuable reminder for national courts still inclined to search first for the literary or artistic category into which a creation should fit. Copyright protection does not depend on finding the right artistic label. The relevant inquiry is originality.
Second, how far may national law restrict the current-events reporting exception to “short extracts”?
Article 5(3)(c) of the InfoSoc Directive contains no formal limitation on the length of the protected material that may be used. Its own standard is functional: the use must not go beyond what is justified by the informatory purpose.
The Court accepts that Member States may restrict the exception to short extracts, but that discretion is not unlimited. Such a restriction must remain proportionate, preserve the effectiveness of the exception and allow its informatory purpose to be achieved.
This qualification matters. A national “short extracts only” rule cannot operate mechanically where it would deprive the exception of its practical effect. The Court itself acknowledges the particular case of a very short text for which the use of extracts may prove impossible.
The relevant question is therefore not simply whether the national legislation says “short extracts”, but whether the limitation, as applied, actually allows the reporting exception to fulfil the purpose for which EU law recognises it.
Third — and particularly relevant for the media industry — commercial activity cannot disqualify the exception.
The Court holds that Article 5(3)(c) precludes a general prohibition on deriving a direct or indirect commercial or financial benefit from the use of protected material when reporting current events.
The reasoning reflects an important practical reality: media outlets perform a fundamental democratic function, but they also generally pursue an economic activity that is necessary for them to operate.
Making the current-events exception dependent on the absence of any direct or indirect economic benefit would therefore undermine its effectiveness for commercially operated media.
This does not create a general licence to reproduce protected content freely, in full, or whenever commercially convenient. The informatory purpose, proportionality, the three-step test and the other requirements of the exception remain fully relevant.
What the judgment does achieve is significant: it removes a major source of legal uncertainty for media businesses by separating the legitimacy of current-events reporting from the mere fact that journalism operates within an economic model.
For written press, broadcasters and digital media alike, that is an important clarification of the balance between copyright, freedom of information and the economic reality of producing news.
CJEU, Case C-598/24, Gândul Media Network, Judgment of 3 September 2026.
Case handled by Turcu & Turcu, in cooperation with Baciu Partners.
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